NEW IDEAS: ANC policy sub-committee chairman Jeff Radebe addresses the media last Monday about the 'second transition'. Picture: Boxer Ngwenya NEW IDEAS: ANC policy sub-committee chairman Jeff Radebe addresses the media last Monday about the 'second transition'. Picture: Boxer Ngwenya
The various ANC discussion documents regarding the so-called “second transition” make for interesting reading.
As the dominant party in our democracy, one that styles itself as a movement that represents the hopes and dreams of the nation (rather than as a normal political party) and as the driver of social change, the ANC is grappling with what it sees as the challenge of strengthening the party’s hold on state power, and of transforming the state machinery to serve the cause of social change.
To this end, the proposals for changes to the provincial (as well as local) government is of particular interest. The ANC document recognises that provincial and local governments do not function as effectively as they should to provide services to the people.
It rejects a proposal for the abolition of provinces, something that is in any case not politically feasible because of the vested interests of those forces in the ANC who have access to power (and the financial perks that come with it) at provincial level and would not want to lose their influence, power and access to tenders.
Instead the document argues that the “problems emanating from the existence of provinces are not structural but are more functional and to do with powers… provinces must be strengthened to play a much more supportive role to local government in service delivery. Thus the powers and functions of provincial government must be refocused and aligned to complement service delivery at local government.”
This seems correct, because the provinces fail to fulfil their task because they are neither full-blown policy developers and implementers, nor mere mechanisms for the implementation of national government policies.
Provinces are seen as important in enhancing the system of both representative and participatory democracy in our system of government. However, this does not mean that the constitution might not have to be changed.
To this end the following important proposals are put on the table for discussion:
The ANC government must reform, rationalise and strengthen provinces. This must ensure:
l That we have fewer provinces – and they must be functional, effective, economically sustainable, integrate communities on a non-racial basis and do away with ethnic boundaries.
l That the powers and functions of the provincial sphere of government be strengthened to ensure more functionality, economic viability and racial/ethnic integration.
l That the role of provincial legislatures be refocused, and mechanism to strengthen legislatures be developed.
l That municipal representation be considered in legislatures to strengthen participatory democracy and representation.
l That the roles and responsibilities of provinces are legislated so as to remove any uncertainty and disputes. This is especially necessary since the district level of government is to be reviewed.
It is difficult not to read these proposals, with their emphasis on the need for the integration of racial and ethnic communities, as being partly aimed at the Western Cape, where the DA is in power and where Africans do not form a majority of the electorate. The ANC document seems to recognise the potentially controversial nature of any rationalisation of the provinces – especially if it will involve the Western Cape – and as such the discussion document contains assurances that the “process to reform, rationalise and strengthen provinces” will be “open, democratic and ensure broader consultation and participation by the public”.
The document then continues: “The ANC must give serious consideration to constitutional requirements to carry out the above, in case there is a need for fundamental changes to provinces. The envisaged policy changes might require constitutional amendments. The key political parties must be sufficiently consulted and be allowed a space to play a role in shaping the provincial reforms.”
These sensitivities may also relate to the fact that any changes to the constitution to rationalise the provinces will not be easily achieved. Section 74 (3) of the constitution states that most provisions in the constitution may be amended by a bill passed by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of its members; and also by the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), with a supporting vote of at least six provinces, if the amendment relates to a matter that affects the NCOP; alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter.
More importantly, section 74 (8) states that any amendment that relates to a matter that affects the NCOP; alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter, but “concerns only a specific province or provinces”, can be passed only by the NCOP if the amendment “has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the province or provinces concerned”.
This means that any amendment to the boundaries of the Western Cape will have to be approved by the Western Cape legislature, something that seems unlikely as long as the DA controls that legislature. If such amendments are indeed envisaged, there are two ways around this problem.
The first would be for the ANC to win the next provincial election in the Western Cape, something that seems unlikely in the near future.
Amending the boundaries of the Western Cape would make a lot of political sense for the ANC. Political scientists who write about one party-dominant democracies have argued – often pointing to the loss of electoral dominance by the Indian Congress Party after it started losing elections in various states – that one way in which a dominant party often loses its electoral dominance is when other parties start winning regional elections. When this happens, the smaller parties will suddenly gain an independent governance base and access to power and resources at a regional level.
Ambitious politicians will then no longer have to join or remain in the dominant party to become part of government while the smaller parties can theoretically demonstrate that they are capable of governing just as well or much better than the dominant party.
The smaller party that wins a regional election will also gain access to state resources at regional level and will suddenly become an attractive partner for the business elite and other role-players who would want to gain that party’s favour to get access to tenders and other economic opportunities.
This will weaken the absolute dominance of the party that governs nationally and will open up opportunities for further regional gains for smaller parties in other regions (or provinces).
Whether the DA is well placed to use its electoral dominance in the Western Cape in this way is an open question. Unless it can transform itself in fundamental ways, voters in other provinces might not flock to it under any circumstances.
But as long as the DA controls the Western Cape, it poses at least a potential threat to the continued national electoral dominance of the ANC, so it would make sense for the ANC to neutralise this threat by changing the boundaries of the Western Cape to rob the DA of its majority.
Professor Pierre de Vos is the Claude Leon Foundation chair in constitutional governance in the department of public law at UCT