By Dr Jaya Josie
Recently in the South African media there was a flurry of articles questioning the reasoning of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) policy decision to ask the Taiwanese liaison office based in Pretoria to relocate to Johannesburg the commercial hub of the country and, in line with the mandatory function of the liaison office.
The first response to DIRCO’s request was from an article in the Daily Maverick (DM) on October 17, 2024. The article states that DIRCO’s request will entail the rebranding of the Taipei Liaison Office (TLO) as a Trade Office in Johannesburg. The article further states that DIRCO has had several engagements with the TLO prior to the request being made. DIRCO has responded expressing concern with the media reports of its engagements with the TLO and described the media reports as a mischaracterisation of its legal prerogative to engage with representatives of all foreign entities based in the country. In addition, DIRCO stated that South Africa’s democratic government had cut ties with Taiwan in 1997, and its actions are in keeping with resolution 2758 of the United Nations General Assembly and consistent with the international community in general.
While the issue is only receiving media attention now during the new Government of National Unity (GNU) following the elections in May 2024, DIRCO has indicated that it has engaged with the TLO six months ago giving its representatives adequate time to relocate. According to DIRCO Pretoria is the capital city of South Africa and diplomatic conventional practice dictates that only foreign embassies should be based there. This is standard diplomatic practice and the relocation to Johannesburg will be a true reflection of the non-diplomatic and nonpolitical nature of the relationship between Taiwan and South Africa. After several engagements DIRCO has finally asked the TLO to vacate its office in Pretoria by the end of October 2024.
Based on media reports in Taiwan the DM reports that the Taiwan authorities are threatening retaliation against what it terms is a forced move from Pretoria. The DM report quoting anonymous Taiwanese diplomats, indicates that the threats include restrictive issuing of visas, educational exchanges and a move away from Taipei of the South African representative. Of course in international relations such threats are extremely undiplomatic and may actually strengthen DIRCO’s argument that the TLO is not a diplomatic office and its threats constitute very undiplomatic conduct. However, the DM report quoting unnamed western diplomats, states that DIRCO was under pressure from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) before the May 2024 election and the installation of the GNU.
Apparently, Taiwan’s new government was under the impression that with the GNU installed South Africa will not follow through with its instruction for the TLO to relocate to Johannesburg. The reason for this position was that the Democratic Alliance (DA), former opposition party in South Africa’s parliament and now a member of the GNU, will take a stand against any policy that sought to go against Taiwan’s presence in South Africa’s capital as the DA has always been sympathetic towards Taiwan. As DIRCO pursued its demand for the TLO to move its office out of Pretoria the DM raises the question as to whether the DA has any influence over the foreign policy of the GNU.
The DM raises this question because on October 7, 2024 DIRCO insisted that the TLO office be removed from Pretoria by the end of October. The question as to whether parties serving in the GNU have any influence on foreign policy is answered in DIRCO’s understanding of
South Africa’s Constitutional and legal implementing framework. The South African Constitution and its legal implementing framework is clear that foreign policy is the prerogative of the President and Executive branch of Government. In the Constitution in Chapter 5, Section 83-102, under the title, Powers and Functions of the President, sub-section (2) The President is Responsible for … (h) receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; (i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives;…
The Constitution makes it absolutely clear that the President is ultimately responsible for South Africa’s foreign policy and it is the President’s prerogative to appoint heads of South Africa’s diplomatic missions, receive foreign heads of diplomatic missions, conduct inter-state relations and enter into international agreements. Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates that the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (Minister), in accordance with Cabinet portfolio responsibilities, is entrusted with the formulation, promotion and execution of South Africa’s foreign policy.
The Minister assumes overall responsibility for all aspects of South Africa’s international relations in consultation with the President. In practice, however, the Minister consults with Cabinet ministers on aspects of importance and cross cutting issues. The oversight and accountability in the formulation and conduct of the country’s foreign policy are vested in the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. DIRCO’s implementation of the country’s foreign policy is governed by The Foreign Service Act, 2020 (Act 26 of 2019) that provides for the management, administration and accountability, and functioning of the Foreign Service. Of course this includes providing services in terms of agreements with foreign representatives in the country.
The partners in the GNU have recourse to influence foreign policy through the parliamentary portfolio committee. The portfolio committee is made up of 11 members including the chairperson and 5 alternate members. The committee includes members of members of the GNU and members of the opposition parties. In the event of a member of parliament wishing to contest a foreign policy decision it will first have to be discussed and voted upon by the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation before going to the full parliament for a vote.
Should the DA take the matter of the removal of the TLO from Pretoria to the Committee for a vote it only has two representatives in the committee. Furthermore, it is unlikely that other opposition members and other members of the GNU will support any interference in foreign policy issues. In a sense DIRCO’s characterisation of the media comment as misrepresentation of its policy stance on the TLO is likely to be supported. Of course this does not mean that the matter will not be discussed in the Cabinet and Executive branch of government.
In fact there is a high possibility that matter will be discussed in this forum in the coming week as another media article by the Citizen newspaper made reference to the fact that the United States members of congress were up in arms against DIRCO’s request for the TLO to relocate to Johannesburg. This report was further exacerbated by the DA’s leader in the GNU making a public statement criticising President Ramaphosa’s declaration that Russia was a close ally and friend of South Africa at the end of the recently BRICS+ Summit in Russia. It is widely acknowledged that President Ramaphosa will use all his negotiating skills to diffuse any tensions in the GNU and that the TLO will be politely requested to move to Johannesburg. The question of China bringing pressure to bear on South Africa is a non-starter because the leader of the DA was recently in the delegation that visited China during the FOCAC summit and entered into many discussions related to his portfolio as the Minister of agriculture.
It is also important to note that the Premier of the Western Cape provincial government also led a delegation to China recently that resulted in huge investments to the Province. The DA governs the Western Cape government and the premier is a leading member of the DA.
In this context it is difficult to see how the DA will turn the issue of the TLO or president’s Ramaphosa’s remarks after the BRICS+ summit into a major issue that will break the GNU. It is important to recall that while the DA and its allies in the GNU are important components, Ramaphosa’s African National Congress (ANC) is still the majority party in parliament. It is also important to note that the opposition parties such as the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) both have a strong position on support for the BRICS and South Africa’s relationship with China.
With regards to the opinion of the United States (US) Congress South Africa’s international policies are governed by constitutional mandates and principles in its Constitutional Bill of Rights and democratic history. With the US presidential elections eight days away it is possible that members of Congress will be more preoccupied with the elections than worrying about the issue of the relocation of the TLO.
In any case members of Congress are also standing for elections and there are indications that the US Republican Party may loose its majority in the US Congress. Whatever the outcome of the discussions in the GNU and the views of Taiwan and the USA, South Africa will maintain its non-aligned international relations policy and compliance with the charter of the African Union, The United Nations Organisation and commitment to its international partners.
* Dr Jaya Josie, Africa Advisor Zhejiang University International Business School (ZIBS); Adjunct Professor, University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the University of Venda (UniVen)
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.