Black South Africans have undergone such dramatic social changes that many are increasingly unable to identify with the ANC, writes William Gumede.
While the ANC remains static, black South Africans, the ANC’s traditional constituency, have undergone such dramatic social changes over the past two decades that many are increasingly unable to identify with the ANC and its current leadership any more.
Black anger at the perceived arrogance, complacence and self-enrichment of the ANC leadership, elite and allied families has now reached a tipping point.
Many black South Africans, whether middle class, working class or impoverished, are so desperate for effective public service delivery that they may not care any more which party is in charge, the colour, ideology or policies, as long as effective delivery takes place.
This means that the official opposition parties - which lacked credibility in the past because of their perceived whiteness, off-the-mainstream ideologies and unrealistic policies, and their small size - will increasingly gain traction among disillusioned ANC supporters.
The DA under Mmusi Maimane is seen as blackening increasingly. This means it will become increasingly difficult for the ANC to draw a distinction between the interests of a white’ DA and a black’ ANC to hold its traditional voters.
It will be difficult to argue that the ANC has better policies for black advancement - ANC constituencies are so desperate for delivery that they may not care much any more about better’ policies - better delivery will increasingly become more important.
Poor, working-class and middle-class blacks are increasingly hard-pressed economically. The black working class and middle class are systemically vulnerable as many of them have financed their assets - housing, cars and furniture - in the post-apartheid era on credit.
During apartheid, blacks could not own property, had little access to finance, had mostly low-paid non-managerial or professional jobs and no inherited capital.
At the same time, because of failing delivery by the state, black South Africans also have to finance private education, health and security.
Their white counterparts during the apartheid era did not have this double burden because the state subsidised them through efficient, whites-only public schools, health and policing.
Furthermore, long-suffering black South Africans contrast their increasingly precarious economic circumstances with the head-spinning amount of public money wasted, lost through corruption and the enrichment of ANC elites.
A downgrade will plunge the South African economy into a tailspin, with poor blacks affected the most. It’s clear that many ANC leaders don’t understand the political, social and economic implications of an economic downgrade.
Most countries that have been downgraded take about a decade to recover economically. It’s unlikely that the ANC will survive the impact of a downgrade electorally - low growth, departing investment and rising unemployment, and concomitant rising social unrest.
The ANC is now seen by many black constituencies as the obstacle to radical social transformation; in short, the social, political and economic development of black South Africans. In 1994, the ANC was seen as the engine for radical transformation.
Many ANC supporters are clearly coming to terms with the fact that there may be other vehicles, whether other political parties or civil movements, to drive radical social transformation. For example, many see the EFF, especially younger blacks, as an alternative movement to drive radical transformation’.
The black DA is now using the language of radical transformation for blacks, evidently with some success.
The DA, for example, now has new sites of power, the Joburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay metros - to show it can better pursue radical transformation that will benefit blacks. In many places the ANC has set the bar very low - all the DA need to do is show visible improvement.
Social movements such as #FeesMustFall are part of the new vehicles for pushing radical transformation’. South Africa’s demography is rapidly changing. Younger people now make up the majority of the voter base.
Many young voters have not experienced the glorious’ struggle ANC, but rather the compromised ANC of President Jacob Zuma.
The splintering of the constituencies of the ANC’s tripartite alliance with Cosatu and the SACP reflects the fragmentation of wider black society, caused by increasingly harsher economic circumstances, poor public ser-vice delivery and rising official corruption.
Cosatu is splitting - and will split further with the rise of new unions as South Africa’s economic, social and labour markets undergo changes.
Furthermore, Zuma’s insistence on staying on until his presidential term expires in 2019, his determination to hand-pick his successor, his battles to prevent his prosecution beyond his presidency and the push-back by opponents will paralyse the ANC and the government and stall attempts to turn the ANC around.
Even worse, depending on the viciousness of the ANC’s succession battle and the outcome, the party may even split again.
At best for the ANC, the outcome of the 2019 national election will mirror the results of the Joburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay metro results of the August 3 local government elections.
The ANC will need then a coalition partner to govern - either the DA or the EFF. The EFF wants the ANC to abolish its name and join under the banner of the EFF or under a new name before entering a national coalition.
The ANC, the party of liberation, faces not only being overtaken by dramatic changes among its electoral base, but also being made extinct by these changes.
* Gumede is associate professor at the School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand, and chairperson of Democracy Works Foundation. He is author of Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times (Tafelberg).
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
The Sunday Independent